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ABSTRACT
Content-Based Image Retrieval Systems used in forensics
related contexts require very good image recognition capa-
bilities. Therefore they often use the SIFT local-feature de-
scription scheme as its robustness against a large spectrum of
image distortions has been assessed. In contrast, the security
of SIFT is still largely unexplored. We show in this paper
that it is possible to conceal images from the SIFT-based
recognition process by designing very SIFT-specific attacks.
The attacks that are successful in deluding the system re-
move keypoints and simultaneously forge new keypoints in
the images to be concealed. This paper details several strate-
gies enforcing image concealment. A copy-detection oriented
experimental study using a database of 100,000 real images
together with a state-of-art image search system shows these
strategies are effective. This is a very serious threat against
systems, endangering forensics investigations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.1 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Content
Analysis and Indexing
General Terms
Algorithms, Security
1. INTRODUCTION
Content-based Image Retrieval Systems (CBIRS) are at
the root of many forensics related applications such as the
copyright enforcement of illegal multimedia contents or the
dismantling of child pornography networks. CBIRS typi-
cally use a (large) database of images together with a so-
phisticated image description scheme having very good and
robust recognition properties: query images can be matched
with database images even if they are severely modified.
Recently, however, it is not the robustness of CBIRS that
is still challenged, but its security [2, 3]. Robustness is the
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answer to general purpose attacks applied to images, such
as cropping, color changes, rotations, filtering, . . . Attack-
ing the security of CBIRS is very different: attacks are in-
stead very specific as they try to defeat the particular tech-
niques used in one system. Pirates accumulate very fine-
grain knowledge on these techniques and subsequently pro-
duce attacks exploiting their flaws. This is a very serious
threat since we will soon face, for sure, elaborated security-
challenging attacks such as [7].
This paper is a step toward understanding what is at stake
when trying to delude the recognition power of CBIRS. We
show that very specific attacks against the popular SIFT
descriptors [6] succeed in severely endangering the image
recognition process. This paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 briefly discusses the properties of SIFT that matter
when challenging their security. Section 3 details the two
typical strategies to delude a system, respectively conceal-
ing an illegal image from identification and polluting the
search results with false positives. Section 4 evaluates the
impact of these strategies against a large scale database used
together with a state-of-art CBIRS. It shows the strategies
are effective in breaking the security of the SIFT description
scheme. Section 5 concludes the paper and suggests some
counter measures.
2. SIFT: KEYPOINT, PATCH, AND LOCAL
DESCRIPTOR
SIFT [6] is probably one of the most popular description
scheme extracting local features from images, and its excel-
lent robustness has been assessed [4]. Given one image, SIFT
first determines keypoints. Then it computes high dimen-
sional vectors using the pixels surrounding each keypoint,
taking scale into account. Image recognition is the result
of the matching between the vectors of the query and the
ones extracted from the database images. This matching is
based on distances as a k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) process
is ran for each query vector. Eventually, a similarity score
is computed from these neighbors.
More formally, keypoint detection relies on local extrema
of the Difference-of-Gaussian function D(x, y, σ):
D(x, y, σ) = (G(x, y, hσ)−G(x, y, σ))⊗ I(x, y)
= ∆Gσ(x, y)⊗ I(x, y), (1)
where ⊗ is the 2D convolution operator, and G(x, y, σ) is
the kernel of the variable-scale Gaussian low-pass filter.
A keypoint is detected at location and scale x = (x, y, σ)T
if the following three conditions hold: (i) D(x) is a local
extrema over a neighborhood of x; (ii) a sustainable contrast
is present, i.e., |D(x)| > C where C is a threshold hard-
coded in the algorithm; (iii) the keypoint is not located on
an edge, which can be detected by tr(H)2/ det(H) < τ , with
H the 2x2 Hessian matrix of D(x).
Each keypoint is subsequently used to generate high di-
mensional vectors, so-called local descriptors. The local de-
scriptor Vx is an illumination-invariant 128-bin histogram of
gradient orientations around the keypoint x = (x, y, σ)T .
Even if the image is severely attacked, it is likely that a
significant number of its local descriptors are still matching
with the ones of the original image [6, 4]. There are sev-
eral reasons for this. First, the robustness of SIFT comes in
part from the keypoint extraction process which is very sta-
ble: a large proportion of identical keypoints are detected in
similar, yet severely distorted, images. Second, these iden-
tical keypoints often define very similar visual patches (rel-
ative to their scales, however). This in turn results in the
creation of local descriptors with very similar values along
their dimensions, likely to match thanks to the k-NN search
paradigm. Last, the robustness of SIFT also comes from
the large number of local descriptors describing one image,
typically around one thousand for a 512x512 pixels image.
Even if a large portion of the keypoints differ between an
original image and its distorted copy, even if the visual dis-
tortions are such that it additionally impacts the local de-
scriptors themselves, these two images need only to share
a few tenth of actual matches for assessing recognition. In
fact, the non-matching local descriptors are likely to vote for
images randomly distributed over the whole database, fail-
ing to significantly increase the score of a particular image.
3. STRATEGIES CHALLENGING SIFT
The performance of a CBIRS is mainly related to the
ability of the description scheme in use to match images
despite distortions. Without loss of generality, the search
process eventually builds a ranked result list of images, such
that highly ranked images are more likely to be true pos-
itive matches. True positives tend to have a particularly
high score compared to the other images in the list. Two
strategies can therefore be designed to delude the recogni-
tion of a system. First, it is possible to attack the image to
be concealed such that its score gets dramatically reduced.
Second, it is possible to attack the image by introducing in
the picture visual elements that often match with other im-
ages from the database, such that the image to be concealed
gets ranked far in the result list. It is of course possible to
combine these two strategies.
This section describes in details several ways to instantiate
these strategies. It visually illustrates their impact using the
well known Lena image. For fairness, it also shows their im-
pact when applying the strategies to the set of 1,000 real im-
ages used in the performance evaluation section of this paper
(see Section 4). Note we computed the local SIFT descrip-
tors using the open-source SIFT-VLFeat code by Vedaldi [8].
We did several experiments to get SIFT-VLFeat descriptors
that are as close as possible to the original SIFT computed
using Lowe’s binary, both in terms of number of descriptors
and of spatial location in images. In our case, the best con-
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Figure 1: A RMD patch has been applied at scale
σ = 2.54 with δ = −1. The z-axis represents the dif-
ference D′(x+u, y+v, σ)−D(x+u, y+v, σ). If the patch
succeeds to lower the targeted DoG coefficient of the
amount δ, it also impacts the DoG values around.
figuration is when peak-thresh=4 (C) and edge-thresh=12,
and 3 intervals per octave.
3.1 Reducing Scores
Concealing an image from recognition by reducing its score
translates into reducing the number of local descriptors that
match. This can obviously be achieved by eliminating some
of its keypoints, but also by modifying the location and/or
scale of keypoints in order to generate different values of the
local descriptors so as to move them far away from their
original position in the high dimensional feature space.
3.1.1 Keypoint Removal
As explained in section 2, keypoints are detected when
local extremum are found in DoG with enough contrast and
away from edges. Avoiding the detection of a keypoint at
x = (x, y, σ)T is possible by applying on the image a visual
patch of a certain size centered at (x, y) such that at least
one of the three conditions above does not hold anymore.
Patching images introduces visual artifacts, and, thus, a side
effect of keypoint removal is the creation of new, undesired
keypoints. We study in the following two keypoint removal
strategies that are extreme in the sense that one is designed
to minimize the local distortion on images, ignoring any po-
tential keypoint creation, while the other takes little care of
the distortion but rather eliminates as many keypoints as
possible while lowering the number of creations.
Removal with Minimum Local Distortion
For the keypoint x = (x, y, σ)T , this approach determines
a patch ǫ to apply on the image such that it minimizes
the local distortion. Since, at scale σ, the Difference of
Gaussian kernel ∆Gσ has a limited support Sσ in the spa-
tial domain, ǫ defined over (x, y) + Sσ modify the quan-
tity D(x, y, σ) of a given amount δ. In other word, for
(u, v) in the neighborhood of (x, y), the image is modified
in I ′(u, v) = I(u, v) + ǫ(u, v) so that D′(x) = D(x) + δ.
The patch should be of minimal Euclidean norm to reduce
the perceptual degradation. This obviously resorts to an
optimization under constraint:
ǫ = arg min
ǫ:D′(x)=D(x)+δ
‖ǫ‖2 (2)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 2: Visual distortions caused by: (a) RMD with C = 4, δ+ = 4 for keypoints at different scales (see on the
lips and the shadow under the left eye), (b) GS+LS7, (c) FMD with C = 4, δ− = 3, and (d) GS+LS7+FMD.
The constraint being affine and the function to be minimized
being convex, a simple Lagrangian resolution yields that
ǫ =
δ
‖∆Gσ‖2 t(x,y)(∆Gσ),
where t(x,y) is the 2D translation operator of a shift (x, y).
This patch controls D(x), however, as illustrated in Fig. 1,
it also modifies the DoG values in the neighborhood such as
D(x+ u, y + v, σ) with (u, v) ∈ [−6hσ√2, 6hσ√2]2 where h
is a constant factor in scale space, chosen as h = 2
1
s with s
the number of intervals in an octave.
Let C be the fixed contrast threshold. We control the Re-
moval with Minimum local Distortion attack (RMD) power
by targeting a limited number of keypoints to be erased. We
introduce a value δ+ > 0 that defines the subset Eδ+ = {x :
C < |D(x)| < C + δ+}. Erasing keypoints in Eδ+ means
that we decrease |D(x)| by an amount |δ| such that its new
value is below the threshold C: |δ| = |D(x)| − C. Obvi-
ously, when δ+ grows, we deal with a bigger subset Eδ+ , and
more keypoints are removed. The most visible artifacts are
caused by the removal of keypoints at higher scales, mostly
because the patches have a bigger support and a stronger
amplitude, as shown in Figure 2(a). Note with RMD, it is
the local distortion around each keypoint that is minimized,
not the global distortion on the whole image.
However, as shown in Table 1, the RMD attack triggers
the creation of new keypoints. Table 1 summarizes the re-
sults when comparing keypoints between the attacked and
the original images. This is also illustrated on Figure 3.
Maximum Removal, Minimum Creation
Local extrema of the DoG correspond to points located on
significant discontinuities in the image. A straightforward
way to avoid their detection consists in smoothing the im-
age. Performing a smoothing on the whole image reduces
the number of keypoints while minimizing the creation of
new ones, as it does not introduce strong discontinuities.
Experiments show this global smoothing is quite effective
when using a Gaussian kernel of small variance (σ = 1.3).
A greater σ would in turn remove more keypoints, but the
quality of the resulting image would be very bad. This global
smoothing strategy is referred to as the GS strategy.
To increase the number of removed keypoints, a second
step of smoothing can subsequently be applied, this time
on a local basis. After having applied GS to one image
Figure 3: Keypoints removal with the RMD attack
on Lena image with C = 4 and δ+ = 7 illustrated
on a subset of keypoints: unchanged (blue), deleted
(green), and new (red) keypoints.
to decrease the number of keypoints, a local smoothing (LS)
phase can be ran on each remaining keypoint: it replaces the
n × n region around the current keypoint by its smoothed
version with a gaussian kernel whose variance equals the
keypoint scale, and checks whether this keypoint is still de-
tected or not. This is in fact performed iteratively using
regions of growing sizes (n = {1, 3, 5, 7}), until the keypoint
is no longer detected. Having n taking values larger than 7
introduces too severe distortions in the images. Therefore, if
the keypoint is still detected when n = 7, then the LS phase
is aborted for that keypoint and the keypoint is left in its
original state. This corresponds usually to keypoints with
large scales. The strength of the LS attacks can be controlled
by the maximum value we allow n to take in {1, 3, 5, 7}: the
strongest LS attack, noted LS7, is when n can take all val-
ues, while with the (less strong) LS5 attack n varies only
within {1, 3, 5}. The visual distortions introduced by LS7
are shown in Figure 2(b). Note one image can be attacked
by applying GS only, or GS+LS.
As shown in Table 1 and Figure 4, both global and lo-
cal smoothing also create new keypoints. Applying LS after
GS results in a smaller number of created keypoints, as key-
points created by GS may be subsequently removed by LS.
The number of created keypoints, however, is by far smaller
than when using the RMD attack.
Table 1: Number of deleted and created keypoints by RMD with δ+ = 7, GS, GS+LS7, and GS+LS7+FMD.
Image Attack # KP % KP #KP % KP # KP after PSNR
deleted deleted created created attack in dB
Lena (1218 keypoints)
RMD 1102 90.48 888 72.91 1004 27.78
GS 1112 91.30 339 27.83 445 31.17
GS+LS7 1172 96.22 270 22.17 316 30.31
GS+LS7+FMD 1174 96.39 383 31.44 427 30.12
1,000 imgs (1026 keypoints, average)
RMD 795 77.49 546 53.22 777 30.70
GS 903 88.01 395 38.50 518 29.17
GS+LS7 967 94.25 321 31.29 380 28.41
GS+LS7+FMD 967 94.25 389 37.91 448 28.23
Figure 4: Smoothing Lena with GS+LS7 illustrated
on a subset of keypoints: unchanged (blue), deleted
(green), and new (red) keypoints.
3.1.2 Shifting Keypoints in Space and/or Scale
Removing keypoints to eventually reduce the scores at
matching time is one option. Another option is to shift
keypoints in the images, either in their (x, y) location in the
image or in their scale. Shifting one keypoint in the image
space also shifts the patch of pixels used for the descriptor
computation, and hence is likely to change the final high-
dimensional descriptor. Shifting the scale of one keypoint
has similar effects: in this case, however, the patch does not
move but its radius gets increased or decreased, which, in
turn, gives different pixels for building the final descriptor.
Overall, this strategy does not remove keypoints but reduces
the likelihood with which they will match with the original,
non attacked, image. Intuitively, the shift must be large
enough in order for the final descriptor to be sufficiently
different and to fail matching.
We have not yet implemented a fully automatic version
of this strategy but it is possible to gain knowledge on its
effectiveness by artificially shifting keypoints in space and/or
scale, thanks to the open source implementation of the SIFT-
VLFeat [8]. We therefore conducted two small experiments
in order to understand how large must be the shift in space
or in scale to significantly reduce the likelihood of matching.
We carefully tracked the whole descriptor creation process
for all keypoints of the Lena image. We then replayed the
creation for these keypoints, but we artificially shifted each
keypoint away from its original location in space (or in scale)
and measured the euclidean distance between the descriptor
associated with that shifted keypoint and its original ver-
sion. Figure 5 shows the result of this experiment when
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Figure 5: Euclidean distance between descriptors vs.
distance between keypoints (Lena image).
considering spatial shifts while Figure 6 is for scale shifts.
Figure 5 shows that shifting keypoints in the image indeed
increases the distances in the high-dimensional space. Scale
matters, however. Overall, this reduces the probability for
that shifted descriptor to be part of the k-NN list. A similar
behavior is observed when shifting the scales of keypoints.
Table 2 gives indications on the locations and scales of the
keypoints created as a collateral effect of applying RMD,
GS+LS (and GS+LS+FMD, see next section). It focuses
on the new keypoints belonging to the first two octaves (-1
and 0), as it is where the majority of creations take place.
For each such new keypoint, we computed its distance to the
nearest original keypoint in the same octave. Averaging for
all created keypoints gives the “avg distance” line in Table 2.
That table also gives the average scale factor between new
keypoints and their nearest original keypoints, regardless of
the octave. It can be seen that new keypoints created by
LS+GS are farther away both in location and especially in
scale than those created by RMD. By using these values to-
gether with Figures 5 and 6, it is possible to get a rough
idea about the general evolution of distances in the feature
space between the new and original descriptors. This cor-
roborates the fact that LS+GS attacks are stronger than
RMD attacks.
3.2 Triggering False Positives
As mentioned in the introduction, the other strategy is to
deliberately create new keypoints so that their descriptors
will match with wrong images in the database, increasing
their scores. Hopefully, querying with the attacked image
will bring at the top of the result list some other images,
Table 2: Properties of the new keypoints: average distance per octave and scale factor between new keypoints
and the nearest original keypoints. The last column only shows the creation of keypoints due to FMD.
Image Lena 1,000 imgs
Attack RMD, δ+ = 7 GS+LS7 GS+LS7+FMD RMD, δ+ = 7 GS+LS7 GS+LS7+FMD
Octave -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0
# KP created 613 188 11 147 68 43 329 141 28 196 36 32
avg distance 3.1 9.1 4.1 7.8 36.3 34.0 4.1 8.7 4.8 10.7 34.6 36.3
avg scale factor 0.21 0.62 0.47 0.80 0.56 0.79 0.26 0.55 0.45 0.77 0.51 0.75
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Figure 6: Euclidean distance between descriptors vs.
scale shift of a given factor (Lena image).
while the original one may either be further away in the list
or not in the list at all. This also raises false alarms spoiling
the trust users can have on the system.
The strategy we use for Forging new keypoints with Min-
imum local Distortion (FMD) is symmetric to the RMD at-
tack. In this case, we address the local extrema in the subset
Fδ− = {x : C − δ− < |D(x)| < C}, and add patches that
strengthen the contrast in the neighborhood of keypoints.
This also reduces the gap between the absolute values of the
first and second eigenvalues, such that the condition on the
Hessian matrix gets verified most of the times. The new
keypoints are easy to add, especially in the first octave, re-
sulting in salt and pepper noise artifacts (Figure 2(c)).
To be created with FMD, new keypoints must meet two
conditions: (i) belong to the two first octaves, such that
the introduced distortion is small, (ii) be located relatively
far away from existing keypoints such that the resulting de-
scriptors are rather different from the existing ones. We thus
create keypoints where their neighborhood of size 8 pixels
is free from original keypoints. Table 2 shows their average
distance from the nearest original keypoint. As expected,
this distance is sufficiently important to trigger descriptors
that will not match with the original ones.
4. LARGE SCALE EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Dataset, Queries, Experimental Protocol
We evaluate the efficiency of the attacks using a large scale
image collection and a real CBIRS. Our image collection
is composed of 100,000 random pictures downloaded from
Flickr that are very diverse in contents. All images have
been resized to 512 pixels on their longer edge. This collec-
tion yields 103,454,566 SIFT-VLFeat descriptors indexed by
the NV-Tree high-dimensional indexing scheme [5]. The NV-
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Figure 7: Average score vs. PSNR (dB). JPEG-,
GS+LS and RMD based attacks.
Tree runs approximate k-NN queries and has been specifi-
cally designed to index large collections of local descriptors.
We then randomly picked 1,000 of these images and ran 9
“security” attacks on them. For comparison, we also applied
49 standard Stirmark “robustness” attacks (rotations, crops,
filters, scalings, . . . ). Overall, there are 58,000 queries dis-
tributed in 58 families. This experimental protocol clearly
targets a copy detection scenario. For all queries, we record
the scores of the 100 best matching images.
4.2 Results
The first experiment illustrates the efficiency of keypoint
removal. We average the score of the 1,000 original images
when searched with 4 RMD attacks and 4 GS+LS attacks,
varying the strength of the attacks. We also collect the aver-
age PSNR observed on the attacked images for each family
of attack. The results of this experiment are on Figure 7,
which additionally depicts scores and PSNR for JPEG at-
tacks with varying quality factors, for comparison. As ex-
pected, both the score and the PSNR drop down as the
attack strength increases (through increasing parameters n
or δ+). It also confirms that the RMD attack yields a bet-
ter PNSR than GS+LS, as it was designed to introduce the
minimum distortion. RMD is less efficient than GS+LS at
lowering the matches, as it creates more descriptors that are
not so different from their original counterpart.
Figure 8 illustrates the result of the full experiment, fo-
cusing on the 9 “security” attacks. The results for the Stir-
mark “robustness” attacks are skipped since none concealed
copies; they were used as sanity checks, however. Along
the X-axis, the attacks differ by the keypoint removal pro-
cess with varying parameters as described in section 3 and
whether the FMD attack is turned off (left side) or on (right
side). The Y-axis of the figure shows, for each attack, the
average scores (over the 1,000 queries) of the original images
that are expected to match with the attacked copies. It also
shows the scores of the first, second and third best match-
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Figure 8: Image scores in realistic settings. X-axis:
9 selected“security” attacks. Y-axis: for each family
of attack, the average scores over 1,000 queries of the
original images and of the three other best ones.
ing images that are different from the original images. When
the image having rank #1 in the result list is the original
image, then the system succeeded in recognizing that image.
When the image at rank #1 is not the original image, then
the system failed. For comparison, the score of the original
images when searched with themselves is around 1,000 and
the second best is below 100.
4.3 Analysis
Figure 8 shows that solely removing keypoints (the 4 at-
tacks on the left) fails at deluding the system. There are
mainly two reasons. First, the gap in scores between the
original image and the best non-matching image is large, and
therefore, at least 90% of the keypoints should be removed
to shrink that gap, which is impossible in practice due to the
severe visual distortion this would cause. Second, keypoint
removal creates new keypoints in their vicinity and it turns
out the corresponding vectors match with the original ones.
When FMD is turned on then things are changing. With
attack GS+FMD, although the original image is found, the
score of the best other image jumps and get much closer. A
detailed examination of the matching shows that the new
forced keypoints are created at small scales and tend to
match with images from the database that have repetitive
visual patterns such as bricks, small windows on large fa-
cades, tiles. Interestingly, despite the size of the collection,
few images have such patterns (see Fig. 9 for an example)
and therefore they concentrate the votes when scoring.
Increasing the strength of these attacks by adding local
smoothing succeed in deluding recognition. With the last
three attacks on the right of the Figure 8, not only few
other images concentrate matches (thanks to FMD) but the
number of keypoint in the attacked image drops (thanks
to GS+LS7), reducing the number of true matches. It is
essential to note the attacked image is not concealed (as its
unmodified copy has rank #2), but it gets “hidden” behind
another image that better matches. This is a key result.
Overall, these experiments are a proof of concept that “se-
curity” attacks can conceal an image, at the cost of a distor-
tion of around 30 dB in PSNR (see Table 1). A “robustness”
attack, such as a JPEG compression with Q = 1, achieves
the same goal but with a PSNR of 23.68dB (see Figure 7).
Figure 9: Images of the database often ranked #1
when the attack succeeds.
Two major lessons can be drawn from this study. First,
solely removing keypoints is not sufficient to delude a system
in real settings. Second, the forgery of new keypoints is
necessary, best if they match with a restricted set of images
from the database. These lessons open several interesting
issues. One is to have the pirate creating artificial images
designed to concentrate votes before inserting them into the
database. This eventually “pollutes” the result list as these
images will get ranked high, hiding the actual matches.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we play the role of a pirate wishing to delude
a CBIRS, in the sense that he wants to conceal from recogni-
tion a copy of a given image in the database. We show that
“security” attacks dedicated to a given CBIR technique are
more efficient than ‘robustness’ attack. In our future works,
we will play the role of the designer, investigating possible
counter-measures. With respect to the attacks presented in
this paper, a possible counter-measure is to use the typical
post-processing steps removing the false positives from the
result list thanks to geometrical verification [1] for example.
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